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FISHERIES GOVERNANCE
Myanmar
Confusion, Uncertainty
Ten years of freshwater fisheries governance reform in the Ayeyarwaddy region of Myanmar 
has led to greater democratization and decentralization, but problems remain
The decentralization of powers in the governing structures of the inland/freshwater fishery sector 
in Myanmar has brought about changes 
in fisheries governance, which can be 
characterized by three inter-related 
processes: movements of small-scale 
fishers (SSF) for greater fishing rights; 
multi-stakeholder engagement in the 
form of fishery partnerships; and policy 
reforms in fisheries co-management. 
Following the decentralization 
of freshwater fisheries governance in 
2008, the Ayeyarwaddy region passed 
a fishery law that recognized some 
rights of SSF, which were previously 
neglected in fishery legislation. The new 
fishery law of 2018 was promulgated 
to recognize the rights of SSF and the 
fishery co-management mechanism. 
In the intervening 10-year period, the 
fishery governance of the Ayeyarwaddy 
region gradually changed in positive 
ways, and the reforms of 2018 brought 
about significant improvements in 
SSF access to fishing rights. At the 
same time, the reform suffers from 
incomplete decentralization, irrelevant 
institutional design and divergent 
interests of the actors involved. 
Even before the British colonial era, 
the inland fisheries sector of Myanmar 
was very productive and the British 
government introduced the auction 
system for the allocation of fishery leases 
in 1875, following the recommendation 
of Francis Day. In 1905, a new fishery 
act was promulgated that furthered the 
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...the higher prices for fishing licences contributed to the 
overexploitation of fishery resources...
economic liberalization of the fishery 
sector, introducing the open auction 
system to “any person.” 
Successive governments followed 
the fishery regulations enacted under 
the 1905 Burma Fishery Act and granted 
exclusive exploitation rights to licence 
holders. During the military government 
period, the 1991 Freshwater Fishery Law 
was enacted, which enhanced revenue 
collection from the inland fishery 
sector. During the 1991-2010 decades, 
large numbers of open auction fisheries 
were demarcated as tender lots and 
allocated to private individuals. The 
process of privatization and provision of 
exclusive rights to individuals excluded 
many local SSF from accessing fishing 
grounds. The system led to a monopoly 
of fishing rights, to the advantage of 
business elites. Successive governments 
– of both the colonial and democratic 
periods – neglected the livelihood 
concerns of local SSF communities and 
regarded the fishery as a mere source of 
revenue. As a result, the poverty levels 
of SSF communities in the Ayeyarwaddy 
Delta increased massively over the 
period. Moreover, the higher prices for 
fishing licences contributed to the over 
exploitation of fishery resources and the 
decline in fish stocks. The livelihoods of 
SSF were thus worsened, pushing them 
into deeper levels of poverty. The result 
was increased conflicts between licence 
holders and SSF in the use of resources – 
and massive out-migration.
According to Shedule II of the 2008 
constitution, the inland/freshwater 
fishery sector has been decentralized 
to the sub-national (state and region) 
levels, in terms of both legislative powers 
and revenue management. This has 
had several positive impacts. First, the 
democratization and decentralization 
process has narrowed the distance 
between SSF and policymakers. The 
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SSF have got opportunities to engage, 
and consult with, new policy actors and 
parliamentarians from their respective 
areas. 
Second, the democratization process 
has led to greater freedom of association 
and media interaction; SSF now have 
the opportunity to establish their own 
organizations and initiate campaigns 
that demand direct access to fishing 
rights. This has also helped bring fishing 
rights issues into the public domain. 
Third, improved access to 
communication has helped the SSF 
movement to access social and political 
processes, as well as to enhance 
communication and collective action 
among the SSF organizations.
Fourth, the democratization process 
has allowed non-state actors to work to 
strengthen civil society organizations 
and NGOs to campaign for a better 
governance system. Many of these 
non-state actors have been working in 
Ayeyarwaddy since the 2008 Nargis 
cyclone in areas like capacity building, 
organizational development, and 
advocacy actions. 
Finally, the democratization and 
decentralization process created a new 
balance in institutional power, limiting 
the role of government in policymaking, 
and forcing it to engage with other 
stakeholders, especially with the SSF 
movement.
In 2011 the SSF sought to abolish 
the tender and lease fisheries system, 
and provide direct access to the 
resources. However, the movement 
failed for several reasons. First, the SSF 
organizations were small, and suffered 
from limited communication and 
collaboration amongst themselves. 
Second, the revenue from fisheries 
contributes to about 39 per cent of the 
total revenue collected by the regional 
government. Thus, the SSF demand for 
abolishing the tender and lease system 
was not acceptable to the regional 
government. 
Thirdly, the fish collectors and 
leaseholders were powerful and 
influential at all levels of decision 
making, with some going on to 
become parliamentarians in the first 
parliament of 2011-2015. Hence, until 
2013 the early movement of SSF was 
not successful. Later they built larger, 
more representative bodies in their 
respective townships. In 2014, the 
Ayeyarwaddy Region Fisher Network 
(ARFN) was established in which 21 SSF 
organizations from different townships 
of the Ayeyarwaddy region were 
involved. After that, advocacy efforts 
shifted from abolishing the tender and 
lease system to increasing equitable 
access to fishing rights through fisheries 
co-management. In this, they had the 
support of NGOs and non-state actors.
Major discussions
Informal and formal engagement 
mechanisms among the stakeholders 
were introduced to resolve resource use 
conflicts. The negotiations for fishing 
rights later led to multi-stakeholder 
engagements for fishery policy reform 
in Ayeyarwaddy region. In 2014, the 
Ayeyarwaddy Fishery Partnership (AFP) 
was established, which became the 
platform for the major discussions on 
inland fishery policy reform.
The 2012 fishery law focused 
primarily on formalizing revenue 
collection mechanisms from the 
regions’ fisheries concessions, and 
reintroduced the auction system for 
better revenue generation from inland 
fisheries. However, the governance 
system remained in favour of large-scale 
fisheries. Worse, the auction system 
led to an escalation in fishing licence 
fees and increased the frequency and 
severity of resource use conflicts. 
Cast net fishing in the flood plain of Kayin State, Myanmar. The 2018  freshwater fishery law of 
Ayeyarwaddy recognizes the rights of SSF and the co-management mechanism
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In early 2017, the Ayeyarwaddy 
Regional Government introduced a 
new policy that allowed a selective 
allocation of tenders directly to fishing 
community groups. This initiative was 
championed by the Regional Minister 
of Agriculture, who pushed through this 
policy, despite objections from powerful 
business interests. For the 2017-18 
fishing season, more than 400 fishing 
grounds were allocated to community 
fisher groups. However, the ambitious 
and unconstitutional executive order 
forced the minister to resign. 
The new minister and regional 
parliament continued to support the old 
policy and co-management initiatives. 
The fishery governance reform was 
accelerated by the promulgation of a 
new Ayeyarwaddy region freshwater 
fishery law in 2018. The new fishery law 
recognizes the fishing and livelihood 
rights of SSF, and the co-management 
mechanisms put in place. 
Several challenges remain in 
the current fishery governance 
reform process. The first relates to 
the provisions of the constitution. 
Although the constitution allows 
for political, administrative and 
fiscal decentralization, it does not 
mandate the relevant institutional 
structures necessary to implement 
the decentralization. Though the 
Ayeyarwaddy region has its own 
constitutionally-sanctioned authorities 
to enact their fishery law, the regional 
government does not have full authority 
to control the Department of Fisheries 
(DOF). 
Further, the constitution allows 
the regional government to collect 
revenue from inland fisheries, but 
the institutional structure prevents 
the regional government’s authorities 
from managing the collected revenue 
and instead, sends them directly to the 
Union treasury. The second challenge 
is due to current practices derived from 
the previous centralized management 
system, under which prices for tender 
and lease are to be increased by 10 per 
cent annually, even as fishery resources 
are declining. 
The third challenge comes from 
the application procedure of the co-
management system. Since most SSF 
communities are poor and most fisher 
families have low education levels, it 
is difficult for some SSF communities 
to make the first attempt to apply for 
co-management. Although the fishery 
law states that DOF officials should 
support SSF groups in preparing for co-
management application, this aim is often 
hampered by inadequate organizational 
capacity, culture and practices. 
The fourth challenge is related to 
the limited financial capacity of the SSF 
communities. Although the regional 
government provides the fishing rights at 
the floor price, SSF communities, in most 
cases, cannot afford to pay the fixed floor 
price. This leads them to remain indebted 
to private moneylenders or fish collectors 
in a relationship of bondage. Evidently, 
the influence of fish collectors or fishery 
business elites may negatively impact the 
co-management led by the SSF. 
Finally, although co-management 
requires consultative efforts and 
long-term investments, the problem 
is that allocation of fishing rights to 
the community is designed annually, 
which leads to confusion and 
uncertainty for SSF in planning for 
fishing rights access in the future.   
https://dc.icsf.net/en/component/dcnews/
articledetail/11363-Myanmar--Develo.
html 
Development could hurt Ayeyarwady 
River: environmentalists
https://unctad.org/en/
PublicationChapters/aldc2017d2_ch08_
en.pdf 
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Comoros, Mozambique, Myanmar 
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...the institutional structure prevents the regional 
government’s authorities from managing the collected 
revenue...
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